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INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years of our “information age,” the workload of the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has grown dramatically, increas-
ing from 238,850 utility-patent applications in 1998 to over 460,000 in 
2008.1  The flood of recent applications has thrust this previously ob-
scure agency into the spotlight.  The PTO faces an unenviable task.  
The volume of patent applications is obviously extremely large.  At the 
same time, evaluating whether a patent should be granted is often a 
highly complex endeavor.2  Proper evaluation requires understanding 
not only the science in the area in which the patent is sought but also 
the manner in which the patent statute applies to the science.3  The 
patent statute itself sets out only a relatively skeletal set of standards 
regarding how patentability should be determined.4
1 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 116 tbl.2, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf [hereinafter PTO, PAR REPORT].
2 Because of the technical complexity of the task involved, the analogy made by 
Professors Abramowicz and Duffy to the Post Office, see Michael Abramowicz & John F. 
Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2009), is not entirely ap-
posite.  Even the analogy to the Social Security Administration understates the techni-
cal complexity involved.  See id. at 1558-64.  
3 See Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System:  Combining Facially Neutral Patent 
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1053-56 (2008) (discuss-
ing how scientifically oriented patentability standards promote the goal of innovation).  
To be sure, the diligence with which this complex task is performed might vary de-
pending on the patent application.  For discussions of alternative application tracks, 
such as accelerated and deferred examination, see infra notes 44-46, 109 and accom-
panying text. 
4 For example, the nonobviousness requirement for securing a patent gives sub-
stantial discretion to the decision maker applying the requirement: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  Moreover, recent case law from the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the Court views nonobviousness and other patent determinations to 
be standards rather than rules. See Rai, supra note 3, at 1038-39.  In contrast, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has tended to take a more formalist approach.  See,
e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:  A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1102-03 (2003) (criticizing the formalist approach to 
patent law then being taken by the Federal Circuit and concluding that a standards-
based approach is both formally and functionally justified); John R. Thomas, Formalism 
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For all of these reasons, one might expect Congress to have estab-
lished a highly muscular patent agency.  This has not happened.  Not 
only does the PTO lack substantive rulemaking authority, but the 
PTO’s reviewing court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
does not give any formal deference to legal decisions made by the 
agency in its statutorily authorized case-by-case adjudication.5
Even in the face of all of these obstacles, the PTO has had some 
success in reforming substantive law in a manner that gives it more 
power in the decision-making process.  The courts appear to have ac-
cepted, at least implicitly, the PTO’s argument that these substantive 
reforms will help the agency manage its workload and improve the 
quality of the patents that it issues.6  In the 2005 case In re Fisher,7 the 
PTO succeeded in convincing the Federal Circuit of the validity of its 
heightened standard for evaluating the utility of patent applications.  
As a consequence, patentees cannot file applications until they have a 
“specific” and “substantial” use for their inventions.8  In 2006, the 
PTO worked with the Justice Department’s Office of the Solicitor 
General to shape Supreme Court interest in and reform of the core 
patentability standard of nonobviousness.9  The result was the Su-
at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (2003) (disapproving of the Federal 
Circuit’s formalist approach). 
5 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 293-301 (2007) (discussing 
the Federal Circuit’s failure to give either Chevron or Skidmore deference to the legal 
determinations that the PTO makes in individual patent cases). 
6 Whether the PTO is correct in its views is ultimately an empirical question.  Given 
the recent vintage of these cases, an empirical verdict cannot yet be rendered.  But the 
argument that, relative to the prior state of affairs, the new case law will result in effi-
ciency and quality improvements is not implausible on its face. 
7 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
8 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097 ( Jan. 5, 2001). 
9 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), the PTO and the 
Office of the Solicitor General filed an influential amicus brief opposing the Federal 
Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) requirement for proving nonob-
viousness. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16-
24, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/3mer/1ami/2004-1350.mer.ami.pdf.  The PTO and the 
Solicitor General were also heavily involved with the effort to persuade the Supreme 
Court to take the case in the first instance.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/2pet/6invit/2004-1350.pet.ami.inv.pdf.  At least in cer-
tain cases, the Federal Circuit had interpreted the TSM requirement to mean that, in 
situations where several prior art references had to be combined to show nonobvious-
ness, the patent examiner (or challenger, if the patent had already been granted) was 
required to identify written documentation suggesting that the references should be 
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preme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,10
which has made it easier for the PTO to deny arguably “obvious” pat-
ents.  In October 2008, the PTO was successful in leveraging the 
threat of Supreme Court intervention on the issue of patentable sub-
ject matter11 to secure from the Federal Circuit an en banc decision, 
In re Bilski, upholding the PTO policy of excluding from patentability 
processes that are not tied to a physical transformation or machine.12
Most recently, the PTO was able to rely on KSR and an earlier Su-
preme Court decision, Dickinson v. Zurko,13 which  mandated signifi-
cant deference to factual findings made by the PTO in the context of 
patent denials, to secure an April 2009 Federal Circuit victory with re-
spect to the PTO’s application of nonobviousness to DNA-sequence 
claims.14
In addition, for the first time, the PTO will soon have in-house 
professional economic assistance to help it make decisions about sub-
stantive examination criteria.  As one of its final moves, the George W. 
Bush administration spearheaded the establishment of an Office of 
the Chief Economist within the PTO Director’s Office.15  If filled 
properly, with a respected economist who is perceived as being objec-
tive, this Chief Economist position could serve as an institutional locus 
for data-driven thinking about how the patent law’s legal standards 
could best serve innovation-policy goals.  Moreover, because the posi-
tion is set up under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), it 
could attract academic economists in the same manner as similar posi-
tions at the FTC and the FCC.16  While these somewhat jury-rigged 
combined.  The briefs filed by the PTO and the Solicitor General focused on the sig-
nificant burdens that a TSM requirement placed on patent examiners. 
10 127 S. Ct. 1727. 
11 In the recent case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, 
Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006), the Supreme Court originally granted certiorari to address 
the issue of patentable subject matter.  Notably, the Court itself raised the issue, even 
though it had not been argued below.  Although the Court ultimately dismissed the 
certiorari petition as improvidently granted, three Justices dissented from the Court’s 
decision.  In the view of Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens, the issue was highly com-
pelling and had been adequately briefed.  Id. at 2921-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
12 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
13 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
14 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
15 Job Announcement, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Chief Economist, Office 
of the Under Secretary and Director (on file with author) (detailing the responsibili-
ties of the Chief Economist). 
16 5 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3376 (2006); see also INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL ACT (IPA) FACT SHEET (2006), http:// 
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mechanisms to influence substantive patent law are hardly a substitute 
for the power conferred by substantive rulemaking authority,17 they 
nonetheless represent a significant win for the PTO. 
By contrast, the PTO’s efforts to regulate the manner in which 
patent applications are processed, where Congress has explicitly given 
the PTO rulemaking authority under section 2(b)(2) of the Patent 
Act,18 could be viewed as less successful.  Perhaps most notably, the 
PTO rules package that limits the number of “repeat” applications 
patentees can file and places additional requirements on applications 
that contain large numbers of claims was the subject of a sweeping ju-
dicial challenge that succeeded in the district court.19  The district 
court’s opinion in this litigation threatened to limit the PTO’s rule-
making authority on questions of procedure to relatively narrow con-
cerns.  Although the Federal Circuit’s March 2009 panel opinion in 
the case takes a more expansive view of PTO authority,20 the opinion 
includes a dissent and may not ultimately persuade the majority of the 
Federal Circuit. 
On first examination, then, it would appear that the agency has 
enjoyed some success in areas where it has limited authority, and is 
operating on tenuous ground in areas where it has been delegated 
explicit authority.  More generally, from the perspective of administra-
tive law, the idea that an agency would have circumscribed control 
over the manner in which it processes its workload is anomalous.  An 
important line of Supreme Court case law stresses that agencies are 
generally in the best position to articulate their own procedural re-
quirements.21  And when the agency in question has over 9000 em-
www.ita.doc.gov/ooms/ohrm17.htm (discussing requirements of the Intergovernmen-
tal Personnel Act, including the possibility of hiring from the academic sector). 
17 While substantive rulemaking authority means that an agency makes substantive 
“law” at the point that it promulgates a rule, the PTO must wait for a private party to 
bring an appropriate test case and then wait for a decision by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit or even the Supreme Court. 
18 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006) (stating that the PTO “may establish regulations” to 
“govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office”). 
19 See infra Section II.D (describing the district court’s decision in Tafas v. Dudas, 
541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), vacated in part sub nom. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), to strike down the PTO’s proposed rules). 
20 Tafas, 559 F.3d 1345. 
21 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 525 (1978) (“[A]dministrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with 
the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts 
or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the indus-
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ployees (including over 6000 patent examiners), the need for signifi-
cant managerial control would appear quite pressing. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, on second examination one sees more 
complexity and nuance.  The PTO faces a set of mutually reinforcing 
challenges that substantially weaken its control over procedure.  First, 
even where reform does not directly involve external interest groups, 
and thus is unlikely to be the subject of a court challenge, the PTO 
has limited room for maneuvering.  Most notably, the complexities of 
collective bargaining with a union that represents over 6000 examin-
ers pose a formidable challenge.   
Once external interest groups get involved, the challenges grow 
even larger.  Because substance and procedure exist on a spectrum, 
separated by no bright dividing line, the PTO’s lack of substantive 
rulemaking authority makes it quite vulnerable to interest-group 
charges that it has overstepped its bounds.  Relatedly, as administra-
tive law scholars have long discussed, any attempt to implement sig-
nificant reform through rulemaking poses a challenge.  Perhaps be-
cause of the PTO’s limited history with rulemaking, it has not shown 
great aptitude in implementing the interest-group outreach that is of-
ten necessary (though hardly sufficient) to meet this challenge.  
Moreover, although the PTO has procedural-rulemaking authority, it 
has not been given fee-setting authority, an important concomitant 
power for an agency with operations that are entirely fee based.   
Finally, there is the anomaly of review by a court, the Federal Cir-
cuit, that itself can lay claim to specialization and expertise—two 
characteristics that administrative law scholars typically see as the ex-
clusive attributes of agencies.  The Federal Circuit’s desire to formu-
late its own procedural rules for the PTO—perhaps most notably in 
the area of inequitable conduct—substantially weakens the agency’s 
ability to regulate interactions with applicants. 
But the fact that anomalies can be explained does not mean that 
they should persist.  In the case of the PTO, ameliorating the difficult 
situation is likely to require making it less of an outlier among admin-
istrative agencies.  Although dramatic changes may be undesirable—
and are, in any event, likely to be politically infeasible—a few relatively 
narrow tweaks affording the PTO some power over procedure could 
produce significant improvements.22
try and the tasks of the agency involved.” (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 
(1965))).
22 A caveat on the normative scope of this Article bears emphasis.  Because transi-
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I reviews the evidence of 
dysfunction and discusses the extent to which difficulties have 
emerged as a consequence of both exogenous forces and problems in 
substantive legal doctrine.  As that Part notes, for better or for worse 
(perhaps better in the case of substantive legal doctrine, worse in the 
case of exogenous forces), both exogenous forces and substantive le-
gal doctrine will, at least in the near term, be considerably different 
than in the recent past.  Part II discusses the area of procedure, where 
little has changed in recent years. It elaborates on the factors, noted 
above, that limit the PTO’s latitude in the area of procedure.  Part III 
outlines realistic near-term possibilities for the path forward, focusing 
on ways in which the current trend toward tying the PTO more closely 
to the administrative state in the area of substantive patent law could 
be mirrored in the area of procedure. 
I. CURRENT DYSFUNCTION: THE ROLE OF EXOGENOUS FORCES 
AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A.  Increased Workload and Backlog 
In the last ten years, the PTO has been confronted with a significant 
increase in numbers of patent applications.  As noted earlier, the num-
ber of utility-patent filings nearly doubled between 1998 and 2008, go-
ing from about 239,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1998 to over 460,000 in FY 
2008.23  The George W. Bush administration, buoyed by a 2005 decision 
by congressional appropriators to let the PTO retain all of the fees that 
it charged,24 attempted to address this increasing workload by hiring 
approximately 1200 new examiners each year in FY 2006 through FY 
tion costs and political feasibility are key background considerations in the Article, it 
does not purport to examine how an ideal system built from scratch would allocate 
power between the PTO, Congress, and the courts. 
23 PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 116 tbl.2.
24 As discussed further below, the PTO is an entirely fee-funded organization.  
However, it has not always been able to keep all of the fees that it collects.  See infra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text.  In the 1990s, for instance, Congress diverted 
hundreds of millions of dollars in fee revenues from PTO coffers.  See, e.g., Figueroa v. 
United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 143 (2005) (analyzing a challenge to the constitutional 
authority of Congress to divert fees in which the plaintiff asserted that $422.5 million 
had been diverted); Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, PTO Fee Diversion Costs Jobs:  Bar, 
Industry United Against Diversion 1 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
intelprop/feediversion.pdf (estimating that “nearly $750 million dollars have been 
withheld from the USPTO in the past decade”). 
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2008.25  However, because examiner attrition rates were also high, net 
growth in the workforce between the end of 2005 and the end of 2008 
was only 1946 employees (about fifty-four percent of total hiring).26
Additionally, end results did not improve.  To the contrary, ac-
cording to the PTO’s own statistics, the elapsed time before an appli-
cant receives an initial response from the PTO increased from 21.1 
months in 2005 to 25.6 months in 2008.27  At the end of FY 2008, the 
PTO had not even begun review of over 770,000 applications.28  A to-
tal of 1,276,028 were listed as pending—that is, either awaiting initial 
review or in the review process.29
In the areas of information and communications technology 
(ICT), delays were particularly acute.  For example, in Technology 
Center 2100, which covers computer architecture, software, and in-
formation security, the elapsed time before a first office action was 
30.8 months; in Technology Center 2600, which covers communica-
tions, the elapsed time was 32.5 months.30
Delays in patent examination can be a challenge for all firms seek-
ing patents.  However, such delays are particularly problematic for 
startups that rely on issued patents to attract venture capital.31  To the 
extent that startup-driven innovation will be an important component 
of any plan to move the U.S. economy out of severe recession, ad-
dressing backlog should be a high priority. 
Delays in patent examination can also adversely affect the ability 
of cash-constrained startups to seek patent protection in other coun-
tries.32  Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), a U.S. applicant 
can specify other countries in which it wants to preserve its U.S. filing 
date but then delay the significant expense associated with actually 
25 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT DATA UPDATE: FY 08, at 4 tbl. (on 
file with author) [hereinafter PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE] (stating that 1211 examin-
ers were hired in 2008, 1215 in 2007, and 1193 in 2006). 
26 Id.  For a discussion of the problem of employee attrition, see infra notes 58-59 
and accompanying text. 
27 PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 fig. 
28 Id. at 118 tbl.5. 
29 Id.
30 Id. at 118 tbl.4. 
31 The empirical data indicate that most biotech firms that receive venture-capital 
backing have issued patents.  See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture 
Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 RES. POL’Y 193, 197 (2007).  Because the Mann and 
Sager data are from the late 1990s, an era of robust venture-capital availability, it may 
actually understate the desirability of patents for life-sciences firms seeking venture-
capital funding. 
32 Thanks to Steven Spinner for noting this point. 
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prosecuting the application in those countries for as long as thirty 
months.33  Thus, at least in theory, a firm that has filed a PCT applica-
tion can save money by waiting to see whether the PTO thinks that the 
invention is likely to be patentable before deciding whether to incur 
the expense of seeking protection in other jurisdictions.  But if there 
are long delays before a patent is examined, the time window for seek-
ing international protection may close. 
Slow examination has not necessarily meant careful and deliber-
ate examination.  Given the large volume of applications, examiners 
still have an average of only about twenty hours to examine applica-
tions.34  Moreover, although patent-grant rates appear to have de-
creased somewhat over the last six years,35 it is not clear whether this 
decrease targets “bad” patent applications (as the PTO argues) or 
represents an across-the-board decision to reject patent applications 
(as some patent applicants argue). 
B.  Causes:  Exogenous and Endogenous 
Some of the PTO’s increased workload can be traced to exoge-
nous causes that would generally be considered positive.  Perhaps 
most notably, because the conceptual distance between basic and ap-
plied research in existing fields, such as biotechnology, is relatively 
narrow, and because certain new fields, such as nanotechnology, have 
immediate commercial application, a significant percentage of cur-
rent academic and industrial research is patentable.36
Substantive patent law doctrine that developed in the 1990s has 
also contributed to the growth in patent applications.  This contribu-
33 Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 22, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231.  While the treaty originally provided for only a twenty-month period, that period 
was subsequently increased to thirty months.  See Revision of the Time Limit for Na-
tional Stage Commencement in the United States for Patent Cooperation Treaty Ap-
plications, 67 Fed. Reg. 520, 520 ( Jan. 4, 2002) (providing notice of extension of the 
time period by the World Intellectual Property Organization). 
34 The precise amount of time available to an examiner depends on her General 
Schedule (GS) pay grade and the technology center in which she works.  U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG 7 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071102.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].  For further 
discussion of the examiner incentive and compensation system, see infra notes 53-54 
and accompanying text. 
35 See infra note 52. 
36 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289-91 (2003) (discussing the narrowing 
of the conceptual gap between basic and applied research in the biomedical arena). 
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tion has arguably been less positive.  The doctrine (overruled by KSR)
that patent examiners show documentary evidence of a prior art sug-
gestion to combine or modify prior art references in order to use those 
references to prove obviousness37 made it quite difficult for the PTO to 
deny patent applications.  Federal Circuit decisions expanding pat-
entable subject matter38 created an opportunity for the filing of large 
numbers of patents with vague claims, particularly in the ICT area.39
The patent-application figure achieved in 2008 may represent a 
peak, at least in the short and medium term.  Exogenous forces in the 
form of a dramatically weakened economy (national and global) are 
likely to contribute to a diminution in application filings, at least for 
the short to medium term.40  The decisions in KSR and Bilski may also 
lead to downward pressure on filings. 
On the other hand, backlog and poor quality are linked not simply 
to exogenous forces and substantive patent law but also to problems 
falling on the procedural side of the substance versus procedure spec-
trum.  Part II reviews these problems and presents five mutually rein-
forcing reasons why they may prove difficult to fix. 
II. THE MANAGERIAL CONUNDRUM
A.  The Current State of Play 
From the perspective of efficient workflow management, the cur-
rent U.S. system of patent filing and examination is quite peculiar.  
The U.S. system is unique in allowing applicants who have been de-
nied the coverage they seek to file “repeat” applications as many times 
as they want.  Repeat applications fall into two distinct categories:  
continuations and requests for continued examination (RCEs).41  Al-
though continuations can share the same priority filing date as their 
37 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
38 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that, to establish patentable subject matter, an applicant need 
only show that her invention is “useful”). 
39 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 9 (2008) (arguing that 
because patent claims in the ICT industries fail to provide notice of patent boundaries, 
both publicly traded and smaller firms in these industries incur large costs associated 
with actual and potential infringement). 
40 See Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand—A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L
IN-HOUSE COUNS. J. 806, 810 (2008) (indicating that, at least from 1982 onwards, GDP 
growth and growth in patent filings have been highly correlated). 
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006) (continuations); id. § 132 (RCEs). 
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“parent” application, they are technically considered new applications.  
In contrast, RCEs represent continued examination of the same  
application.  Continuations also have a much longer history than 
RCEs—continuations have existed for decades, while RCEs were only 
established in 1999.42
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the two types of repeat appli-
cations now tend to be used in similar ways.  Both continuations and 
RCEs are typically used to adjust the scope of the initial patent appli-
cation so that it yields the patent, or set of patents, that is most com-
mercially useful to the applicant.  For at least certain segments of the 
biopharmaceutical industry, continuations appear to serve as a 
mechanism for claiming the particular molecule within a genus of 
compounds that ultimately proves successful in clinical trials.43  For all 
applicants, continuations (though not RCEs) can serve as a mecha-
nism for securing narrower coverage in an initial patent while holding 
out for broader coverage in a continuation.44
One might argue that an applicant determined to secure optimal 
coverage (within the bounds of the relevant substantive patent law) 
should be able to use repeat filings for that purpose.  On this view, re-
peat filings would represent a second-best option when the first-best 
option—either a fully reliable initial examination or the ability to de-
fer examination pending a determination of precisely what claim 
scope the applicant needs (or whether the applicant ultimately needs 
patent protection at all)—is not available.  For reasons discussed fur-
ther below, the first-best option of a reliable initial examination may 
not currently be available.  Deferred examination is currently available 
in limited form,45 but this limited form is suboptimal because appli-
42 RCEs were established as part of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 4403(2), § 132(b), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-560 (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006)). 
43 See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees GlaxoSmithKline at 8, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. 
Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Nos. 07-1008, 07-0846). 
44 Interestingly, although the biopharmaceutical industry is most adamant in op-
posing the limitations the PTO has attempted to place on continuation and RCE filing 
(and is the lead plaintiff in the case challenging these limits), Technology Center 
2100—computer architecture, software, and information security—currently receives 
the most RCEs.  In FY 2008, thirty-six percent of total filings in Technology Center 
2100 were RCE filings.  John J. Doll, Deputy Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual 
Prop. and Deputy Dir. of the USPTO (Acting), U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Slide 
Presentation:  Patents Business Unit 17 (on file with author) [hereinafter John Doll, 
Slide Presentation]. 
45 37 C.F.R. § 1.103(d) (2008); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PAT-
ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 709 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) [hereinafter PTO, MPEP], 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r6_0700.pdf.  Ap-
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cants have to determine at the outset the precise time period for 
which they want to defer examination.46
But even if repeat filings can be justified, we might expect that the 
cost that any filing—repeat or, for that matter, initial—imposes on the 
system would be borne by the applicant.47  This does not happen.  As 
noted, the PTO is an entirely fee-based organization.  However, under 
the current fee structure, a large percentage of the front-end exami-
nation cost is recouped through back-end issuance fees as well as 
maintenance fees, which are considerably higher than front-end filing 
fees.48  Specific numbers from recent years illustrate the magnitude of 
the cross-subsidy.  The PTO estimates that in fiscal years 2005 to 2008, 
the average examination cost per patent has ranged between $3773 
and $3961.49  By contrast, the initial filing fee, which is supposed to 
cover filing, search, and examination, is $1090.  Issuance fees are sev-
enty-four percent higher ($1480), and maintenance fees (due at 3.5, 
7.5, and 11.5 years) are $1020, $2320, and $3580, respectively.50
Not only do applicants who secure and maintain patents dramati-
cally subsidize those whose patents are denied, but the current fee 
structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to 
grant patents.  The skewed incentive structure may be based on a policy 
judgment that patent applications, even those that ultimately end up 
being nonmeritorious, should be encouraged.  Relatedly, it could be 
based on the supposition that false positives, in the form of patent ap-
plications that are improperly granted, are better than false negatives, 
in the form of patents that are not applied for in the first instance.  But 
plicants can also defer examination de facto in various ways.  For example, they can 
use the availability of a thirty-month delay under the PCT application process to defer 
examination.  The benefits of improving current methods for deferring examination 
are well articulated in Steven Bennett & David Kappos, Deferred Examination:  A Solution 
Whose Time Has Come, IP WATCH, Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 
2009/03/12/inside-views-deferred-examination-a-solution-whose-time-has-come.  No-
tably, an improved system of deferred examination could in all likelihood be imple-
mented through PTO regulation, so long as the PTO’s procedural-rulemaking author-
ity is not interpreted in an unduly cramped fashion.  See infra subsection III.A.1. 
46 Bennett & Kappos, supra note 45. 
47 As discussed further in the text, requiring appropriate payment for the filing of 
patent applications may be particularly desirable to the extent that, even after they are 
issued, patents impose significant deadweight loss and transaction costs. See infra Sec-
tion II.C.   
48 For FY 2008, maintenance fees were the PTO’s largest source of earned reve-
nue.  PTO, PAR REPORT, supra note 1, at 56 fig. 
49 Id. at 43 fig. 
50 Revision of Patent Fees for Fiscal Year 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,534, 47,535 (Aug. 
18, 2008) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g)). 
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the case for such a policy judgment has not been made.51  Meanwhile, 
the skewed structure creates additional patent applications that add to 
backlog.  Additionally, in contexts where quality concerns counsel in 
favor of granting a relatively small percentage of applications, the struc-
ture creates the potential for significant revenue shortfalls.52
On the examiner side of the equation, incentives are also peculiar.  
The compensation system for examiners awards credits, or “counts,” 
for only two specific actions taken during the examination period:  
“first office actions” and “disposals.”53  The examiner receives a first-
office-action count by making a preliminary communication to the 
applicant as to whether the application is allowable (thereby permit-
ting the applicant to amend claims as necessary or to contest the ex-
aminer’s conclusion).  A variety of actions on the part of either the 
examiner or the applicant can produce a disposal count.  Such actions 
include allowance of the application, abandonment (which can occur 
not only when the applicant entirely drops an application but also 
when she files a continuation), and an RCE. 
Counts must be achieved within an allotted period of time that is 
calculated based on the experience level of the examiner and on the 
complexity of the technology at issue.  A recent report by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) explains that 
51 Interestingly, some economists have argued against self-funding of patent of-
fices on the grounds that such self-funding will cause offices to set initial application 
fees too high.  See Joshua S. Gans et al., Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices,
TOPICS IN THEORETICAL ECON., 2004, at 1.  But these economists work within a line of 
economic theory that assumes policymakers cannot measure the social value of inven-
tion, and therefore the socially optimal approach is to encourage the maximal number 
of patent applications, grant such applications, and then cull ex post through renewal 
fees. Id. at 1-3 (discussing theoretical literature).  Under this line of theory, it is not 
clear why a patent office (or litigation system) with validity criteria would exist in the 
first instance.  Any patent for which an entity was willing to pay renewal fees would be a 
patent worth having from a social standpoint.  Presumably this could include patents on 
public domain information.
52 As noted earlier, in recent years the PTO has reduced the percentage of patents 
that it grants during the first round of examination.  See John Doll, Slide Presentation, 
supra note 44, at 12 (showing an allowance rate of 44.2% in 2008, a drop from rates of 
about 70% in 2002).  Although the grant rate is higher once continuations and RCEs 
are taken into account, a downward trend can be discerned.  See Mark A. Lemley & 
Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 182-89 
(2008) (discussing recent data, including figures regarding continuations and RCEs).  
Of course, percentages tell us very little about whether the PTO grant rate is too high, 
too low, or just right.  This is particularly the case because patent scope can be modi-
fied substantially in prosecution.  Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the 
relevant concern is not grant rates, but appropriate incentive structures for both appli-
cants and examiners. 
53 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 7. 
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a GS-12 patent examiner working on data processing applications is ex-
pected to achieve two counts in 31.6 hours, whereas a GS-12 patent ex-
aminer working on plastic molding applications is expected to do so in 
20.1 hours.  In contrast, GS-7 examiners working on these two types of 
applications are expected to achieve two counts in 45.1 and 28.7 hours, 
respectively.
54
This production framework has not changed since 1976.55
Various analysts have argued that the framework no longer reflects 
the work required to consider patent applications.56  In certain cases, 
as a consequence of improvements in automation of the prior art 
search, the time allotted may be too high.  In other cases, the increas-
ing complexity of a particular scientific or technological area (and the 
associated patent applications) creates a situation in which the time al-
lotted may be too small.57  The mismatch has an obvious impact on ex-
aminer morale.  Indeed, the GAO report discussed above concluded 
that high rates of patent-examiner attrition were largely a function of 
overly demanding, or at least outdated, production goals.58  Attrition 
creates inefficiencies for all organizations.  For the PTO, however, the 
inefficiency may be particularly costly—those who leave tend to do so 
after only three to five years, precisely the point at which the PTO’s in-
vestment in training is beginning to pay off in terms of output.59
The production framework may also create incentives for examin-
ers to prolong patent examination by “forcing” repeat applications.  
Specifically, to the extent that examiners determine that they cannot 
do an adequate job in the time allotted for an examination, they can 
use various tactics to encourage applicants to file continuations or RCE 
applications.  Even though examination of a continuation should be 
easier since the examiner has seen the application before, examiners 
54 Id.
55 Id. at 8. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 5 (stating that sixty-seven percent of surveyed patent examiners 
cited production goals as “among the primary reasons they would consider leaving the 
USPTO”). 
57 In general, the total number of claims per issued patent appears to have in-
creased almost one-hundred percent since 1976.  Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent 
Law Blog (Patently-O), Rising Claim Counts, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/ 
12/rising-claim-co.html (Dec. 23, 2007).  Most of this increase has occurred in de-
pendent claims. See Ron D. Katznelson, Bad Science in Search of “Bad” Patents, 17 FED.
CIR. B.J. 1, 26 fig.3 (2007) (reporting that the average number of total claims rose from 
approximately fourteen in 1990 to twenty-four in 2002). 
58 GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 5-6. 
59 See id. at 5 (stating that seventy percent of those patent examiners who left the 
PTO between 2002 and 2006 worked there for less than five years). 
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receive the same amount of credit for conducting a first office action 
on a continuation as on an original application.  Meanwhile, as noted 
earlier, continuations and RCEs also redound to the benefit of appli-
cants, as they are subsidized for pursuit of optimal claim coverage. 
As noted above (and discussed further below), the PTO’s attempt to 
limit patentee use of repeat applications is currently the subject of litiga-
tion that threatens the agency’s power to manage its workload.  A more 
direct alternative, which would not have required rulemaking or perhaps 
even negotiations with outside interest groups, might have been reform 
of the scheme that establishes incentives and compensation for examin-
ers.  Indeed, at least two prominent reports issued in the last five years—
both the GAO report discussed above and a report by the Department of 
Commerce’s Inspector General60—have recommended such internal re-
forms.  The next Section considers why such reform, though highly ap-
pealing in theory, may be difficult to achieve in practice. 
B.  Internal Reforms:  Examiner Incentives and Prior Art Searching 
Presumably, the goal of internal reform would be to ensure that, 
at least on the examiner side, delaying behavior is not rewarded and 
time allocated better corresponds to the time required for any given 
application.  But such complex recalibration may be difficult to im-
plement in a work environment where the patent examiners’ union 
tends to view management-proposed changes as attempts to squeeze 
examiners further with respect to the time that they have to examine 
applications.61
Union resistance to management-proposed changes may also pose 
an impediment to longstanding hopes that greater examination effi-
ciency and quality could be achieved either through outsourcing prior 
art searches or through reliance on the prior art searches of foreign 
patent offices.  Proponents of the outsourcing scenario argue that 
separating the prior art search function from the examination function 
could yield specialization-related efficiencies.  Proponents of the inter-
60 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL INSPECTION RE-
PORT NO. IPE-15722, USPTO SHOULD REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRO-
DUCTION 30 (2004), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2004/USPTO-
IPE-15722-09-04.pdf. 
61 See Press Release, Patent Office Prof’l Ass’n (POPA), Fixing the USPTO:  Doing 
the Job Right the First Time (Aug. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter POPA, Fix-
ing] (discussing the current “culture of conflict” at the PTO and stating that examiners 
need more time to do their job correctly). 
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national work-sharing scenario note the very significant inefficiency of 
having U.S. examiners do prior art searches on the many foreign ap-
plications that another patent office has already searched thoroughly.62
Although these arguments are compelling,63 realizing efficiencies 
would require examiner assent to a reduction of counts achieved on 
applications for which a prior art search has already been done.  Such 
assent may be difficult to achieve.  Indeed, although the PTO has vig-
orously pursued various work-sharing programs with other offices,64 it 
has not, at least thus far, attempted to translate this work sharing into 
a restructuring of the count system. 
Union arguments about examiner workload are buttressed by the 
reality of high attrition rates among patent examiners.  Particularly dur-
ing times of economic growth (precisely the times when patent applica-
tions tend to grow),65 examiners often have lucrative alternative oppor-
tunities in the private sector.  Thus, PTO management has limited 
latitude to undertake change that makes (or is perceived as making) 
additional demands on examiners.  At a minimum, it cannot undertake 
such change without offering significant compensatory benefits. 
Compensatory benefits in the form of higher salaries or substan-
tially improved information-technology tools (the information-
technology infrastructure at the PTO is notoriously poor and better 
tools are a prominent demand of the examiners’ union66) might be 
possible.  However, in order for such benefits to be offered, the PTO’s 
budget would have to grow.  At a minimum, the PTO would need 
62 See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Stephen G. Kunin, Improving the Effectiveness of 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Fall-Winter 2008/2009, at 72, 
76, available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/01/improving-the-effectiveness-
of-uspto (noting the “debilitating redundancy” of the current patent search and ex-
amination system). 
63 In the case of outsourcing, one could argue, however, that greater segmentation 
might produce transaction costs that exceeded efficiencies.  This argument parallels 
the literature on the comparative advantages of markets and firms.  See generally OLIVER 
HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 5-6, 23-28 (1995) (explaining 
how transaction costs compel a frequent user to seek ownership, thereby avoiding the 
costs of ambiguous contracts). 
64 See John Doll, Slide Presentation, supra note 44, at 39 (discussing implementa-
tion of pilot programs with the United Kingdom, the European Patent Office, and the 
Korean Patent Office, as well as full implementation as of January 4, 2008, of work 
sharing with the Japanese Patent Office). 
65 In the last fifteen years, examiner attrition rates have been highest when the 
economy is strongest.  In FY 2000, for example, the attrition rate peaked at 13.77%.  In 
FY 1999, it was 12.52%.  PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE, supra note 25, at 4. 
66 See POPA, Fixing, supra note 61 (stating the need for updates to the U.S. classi-
fication system so that examiners can find the best prior art). 
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greater control over its budget.  In contrast with the purely internal 
reforms discussed thus far, reforms involving fees obviously require 
some level of assent from external interest groups.  The next Section 
turns to the critical, but hotly contested, question of fees. 
C.  Limits on Authority over Fees 
Although the PTO has authority to set a few fees by regulation, 
any significant change in the major fees that it charges—filing fees, 
issuance fees, and maintenance fees—currently requires congressional 
action.67  The generally modest pace of congressional action in the 
patent arena does not afford the PTO the flexibility over fees that it 
needs to manage its workload.  In addition, although Congress has in 
recent years allowed the PTO to keep all of its fees, the patent statute 
currently requires that this decision be made annually by congres-
sional appropriators.68
Patent-reform legislation proposed in the 111th Congress gives 
the PTO authority to set most major fees so long as the “fee amounts 
are set to reasonably compensate the Office for the services per-
formed.”69  Giving the PTO permanent regulatory power to impose on 
applicants a “pay as you go” strategy and ensuring a permanent end to 
fee diversion would be a significant improvement over the current sys-
tem of cross-subsidy and year-by-year assessment of the fee-diversion 
question.  Such a system would stabilize the PTO’s budget and allow 
for long-term planning. 
Securing this regulatory power—or even a one-time fee restructur-
ing—may prove difficult, however.  For the last few years, legislation 
on fees has been bundled with other, more contentious provisions 
(perhaps most saliently, provisions concerning damages apportion-
ment in litigated cases).  Whether Congress would entertain fee legis-
lation divorced from such highly contentious provisions is unclear.  In 
addition, even such stand-alone legislation would not necessarily pass 
easily.  For example, the February 2003 Strategic Plan for the PTO 
announced by then-Director James Rogan would have raised and re-
67 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(d) (2006) (limiting the PTO’s discretion in setting fees to 
minor issues such as “processing, services, or materials”). 
68 Id. § 42(e). 
69 S. 610, 111th Cong. § 9(a)(1) (2009).  The legislation sets up a fairly elaborate 
consultation-and-comment scheme that the PTO must follow before any fee change 
can become effective.  The PTO must consult with the Advisory Committees (the Pat-
ent Public Advisory Committee and the Trademark Public Advisory Committee) and 
also seek comments from the general public and Congress. 
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structured fees considerably.70  Various patent interest groups rebelled 
against these proposed fee increases, and the PTO ultimately with-
drew its request for legislation to implement the increases. 
To be sure, in the case of the fee increases proposed by Director 
Rogan, interest groups protested most vigorously provisions that 
would have imposed claim fees that increased in a nonlinear fashion 
for more than three independent claims and more than twenty total 
claims.71  As the PTO admitted, this nonlinear escalation was not nec-
essary to compensate the Office for services performed.  This element 
of the reform package (as well as certain other elements) took a good 
idea with some political feasibility—fee increases and restructuring—
and expanded it into a proposal that was highly objectionable to in-
terest groups.  The efforts by Director Rogan suggested a lack of po-
litical sensitivity that would (as discussed further below72) be a persis-
tent feature of the PTO’s reform agenda. 
In fairness to the PTO, a fee structure that does more than “rea-
sonably compensate” the PTO for services performed is not necessarily 
a bad idea.  Such a fee structure might be put into place to deter filing 
behavior that imposes costs not only on the PTO but also on society as 
a whole.  Whether patents with large numbers of claims impose larger 
social costs, however, is not clear.  These large numbers of claims may 
reflect an effort to seek appropriate patent scope against a background 
law that imposes significant sanctions on applicants who file a small 
number of broad claims that they are then asked to narrow.73
A better use of fees to achieve deterrence might take aim at the 
“patent portfolio” approaches used by many ICT firms.  As has now 
been well documented, ICT firms often amass large patent portfolios 
on the grounds that they need defensive patents as protection against 
70 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 3 
(2003) (“This strategic plan cannot succeed without . . . changing the USPTO’s cur-
rent fee schedule and access to revenue generated . . . .” (italics omitted)). 
71 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN: FEE 
PROPOSAL COMPARISON CHART, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/ 
feeproposalcomparison.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (showing proposed charges). 
72 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (describing continuation and 
claims rules). 
73 The sanctions in question emerge from the doctrine of prosecution history es-
toppel.  Under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this doctrine, patentees who nar-
row broad claims during prosecution in response to an examiner’s objection are se-
verely limited in their ability to assert in subsequent litigation that a defendant 
infringes by utilizing an invention substantially equivalent to the patented invention.  
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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lawsuits from their competitors.74  This strategy of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD) appears to be socially wasteful,75 especially if one 
takes into account the possibility that some of these ICT patents will 
fall into the hands of nonpracticing entities that are not subject to the 
logic of MAD and instead use the patents for holdup purposes. 
Moving ICT firms away from the socially wasteful MAD strategy 
represents a significant collective action problem, however.  More-
over, increasing fees to a level that merely allowed for reasonable com-
pensation for services performed is not likely to do enough to address 
the collective-action problem.  Although the data on the question are 
limited, several recent studies have suggested that at low fee levels, 
patent demand is relatively inelastic.76  In fact, an intellectual property 
attorney at one of these large ICT firms recently argued that a filing 
fee as high as $50,000 (applicable, he would suggest, only to large 
firms) might be necessary to curb filing significantly.77   
Even for large firms, such a dramatic increase in filing fees would 
be quite problematic.  Moreover, imposing such a fee starting at the 
first application would imply that all filing is an activity to be deterred.  
This deterrence aim is squarely inconsistent with the standard argu-
ment that certain levels of patent protection are conducive to innova-
tion for all firms, regardless of their size. 
 On the other hand, an argument can be made for some level of 
taxation in connection with patent portfolios.  In this regard, a system 
under which firms were charged a slightly increased fee for each addi-
74 See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited:  An 
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 104 (2001) (documenting defensive patenting in the semiconductor industry); see 
also Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights:  Are Small 
Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2004) (finding, based on a study of determi-
nants of patent suits from 1978–1999, “that patentees with a large portfolio of patents to 
trade . . . are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits”); Gideon Parchomovsky & 
R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26-27, 36 (2005)(discussing defen-
sive patent-portfolio behavior among ICT firms more generally). 
75 The argument that the MAD strategy is not socially wasteful would have to rest 
on the assumption that defensive patenting promotes interfirm exchanges of informa-
tion that would not otherwise occur.  However, there is little, if any, empirical evidence 
that firms in the ICT industry actually read patent disclosures (or that these disclosures 
provide useful information in any event). 
76 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 40, at 810-12 (arguing, based upon a model that uses 
U.S. application and fee data over the last four decades, that filing fees need to be 
raised significantly in order to reach the elastic portion of the demand curve). 
77 Id. at 812 fig.5 (estimating that applications might fall to 100,000 if filing fees 
were raised to $50,000). 
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tional patent application they filed in any given year is an interesting 
possibility.78
A full discussion of the merits and demerits of such a “progressive” 
fee system is beyond the scope of this Article.  One obvious demerit is 
that it creates the potential for gaming through the formation of shell 
companies or other mechanisms.  More generally, regulating behavior 
through fees is likely to be a highly complex and politically sensitive 
endeavor.  For present purposes, the point that bears emphasis is that 
such a structure would have (by far) the greatest impact on large 
technology firms that file thousands of applications each year.  In 
2008, for example, virtually all of the firms that secured more than 
500 patents were large technology firms.79   
One legal difficulty with PTO implementation of a fee structure 
that was intended to tax applicant behavior, and not simply to com-
pensate the PTO for examination costs, would be that Congress might 
explicitly have to grant the PTO taxation authority.  Although the Su-
preme Court has stated that agencies can be authorized by Congress 
to impose taxes, it has also stated that if Congress wants to delegate its 
taxation authority to an agency, it must do so explicitly.80  On the 
other hand, as discussed further in Part III, such authorization could 
be part of a scheme in which Congress gives the PTO some level of au-
thority over fee setting. 
D.  The Blurry Line Between Substance and Procedure 
In lieu of a complex renegotiation of the incentive scheme for ex-
aminers that would have been constrained by a limited budget, and 
78 I thank Bruce Sewell for this suggestion.  In fact, even if the PTO’s goal were 
simply to charge applicants for the cost that they imposed on the Office, charging an 
increased fee for each additional application might be a plausible strategy.  The avail-
able empirical evidence indicates that ICT firms that file significant numbers of patent 
applications are more likely than other firms to shift the costs of searching for prior art 
onto the PTO.  See Juan Alcácer et al., Applicant and Examiner Citations in U.S. Patents:  An 
Overview and Analysis (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 09-016, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273016 (finding that the percentage of prior art citations 
added by the examiner is highest in the ICT area and among “prolific patentees”). 
79 See Press Release, Wolters Kluwer Health, IFI Patent Intelligence Analysis of 
2008’s Top U.S.-Patent Recipients Suggests America May be Losing Dominance ( Jan. 
14, 2009), available at http://www.ificlaims.com/IFIPatents010909.htm (listing the 
“top 35” recipients of U.S. patents in 2008). 
80 See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989) (“Congress must 
indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to 
recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties . . . .”). 
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having failed to secure reform in the area of fees that might have 
helped the budgetary situation, the PTO chose a different path.  The 
path it chose was to promulgate rules that required applicants that 
wanted to file more than two continuations (or continuations-in-part) 
and one RCE to make a showing of good cause as to why they needed 
another application.81  The PTO also required that, in cases where the 
applicant was seeking more than five independent claims or twenty-
five total claims, the applicant provide an “examination support 
document” certifying the performance of a prior art search,82 identify-
ing the prior art “references deemed most closely related to the sub-
ject matter of each of the claims,”83 and discussing “how each of the 
independent claims is patentable over the cited references.”84  In Ta-
fas v. Dudas, a 2008 decision, a district court struck down these rules as 
“substantive rules that change existing law and alter the rights of ap-
plicants . . . .”85
For administrative agencies with substantive rulemaking authority, 
the issue of whether a rule is substantive or procedural typically arises 
when an agency is seeking to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking 
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).86  Un-
der the APA, rules that are substantive (as opposed to procedural or 
interpretive) usually require notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Thus, 
from the perspective of an agency that has substantive rulemaking au-
thority, a court’s disagreement with its decision regarding the sub-
stance versus procedure distinction has a limited impact.  Such a dis-
agreement simply means that, if the agency is truly committed to the 
rule, it will have to utilize notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
In the case of the PTO, by contrast, the stakes are much higher.  
Indeed, the district court opinion in Tafas v. Dudas would have elimi-
nated the agency’s authority to make rules managing its workload in 
any situation where a patent applicant could perceive those rules as 
altering her rights in any significant manner. 
To be sure, as discussed further below, there are legitimate rea-
sons to believe the continuation and claims rules do not resolve the 
81 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2008). 
82 Id. § 1.75(b)(1). 
83 Id. § 1.265(a)(2). 
84 Id. § 1.265(a)(4). 
85 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
86 See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dis-
cussing the distinction between procedural and substantive rules with regard to a De-
partment of Health and Human Services peer review system). 
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PTO’s problems.  But in this case, judicial minimalism at the district 
court—for example, striking down the rules on the ground of imper-
missible retroactivity87—would have been preferable to a broad decla-
ration that a rule’s alteration of the rights of a patent applicant ren-
ders that rule substantive.88
At least for the moment, the district court’s sweeping interpreta-
tion has been overturned by a panel of the Federal Circuit.  On ap-
peal, Judge Prost, writing for the majority, invoked D.C. Circuit case 
law to hold that a rule is not substantive within the meaning of section 
553—and hence for purposes of the PTO’s authority—simply because 
it “alter[s] the manner in which the parties present themselves or 
their viewpoints to the agency.”89
Although Judge Prost’s opinion has considerable merit, whether it  
will ultimately persuade a majority of the Federal Circuit is open to 
question.  Another recent Federal Circuit panel opinion, Cooper Tech-
nologies v. Dudas,90 appears to follow the Tafas district court in empha-
sizing the effect on “individual rights and obligations” as a touchstone 
of substantive rulemaking.91  Judge Rader’s dissent in Tafas would 
have affirmed the district court by emphasizing the approach taken in 
Cooper Technologies.  As a consequence, even after the panel decision in 
87 Impermissible retroactivity is a ground advocated for in a Federal Circuit amicus 
brief filed by the American Intellectual Property Law Association.  See Brief for Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Tafas v. 
Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Nos. 07-1008, 07-0846).  Even a determi-
nation that the rules were arbitrary and capricious as a policy matter would have had a 
relatively limited impact. 
88 A Federal Circuit amicus brief to which I contributed argued that the test used by 
the district court is incorrect.  Brief for Intellectual Property and Administrative Law Profes-
sors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (Nos. 07-1008, 07-
0846).  For further discussion of the law governing the distinction between procedure and 
substance, see infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
89 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
90 536 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
91 Id. at 1136 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)).  The Tafas court distinguished Cooper Technologies by arguing that in Cooper Tech-
nologies the panel was deciding the meaning of substantive rules relative to interpretive 
rules, not parsing the substance/procedure divide.  Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1354-55.  The Tafas
majority also argued, quite correctly, that a Supreme Court decision, Chrysler v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979), which noted in passing that substantive rules “affect[] individual 
rights and obligations,” id. at 302, was not making a determination regarding the distinc-
tion between substance and procedure.  Indeed, the Chrysler Court addressed the issue of 
substance as a preliminary step in the context of a different inquiry—that of whether a 
particular regulation should be deemed to have the “force and effect of law.”  Id. at 301. 
2009] Growing Pains in the Administrative State 2073
Tafas, how the PTO should go about managing its caseload while re-
maining within the limits of the law is not entirely clear. 
E.  Negotiating Interest-Group Arguments 
As administrative law scholars have long discussed, the availability 
of pre-enforcement judicial review of regulation poses a challenge 
even for well-established agencies like the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).  One conservative estimate puts the percentage of 
challenged EPA rulemakings at twenty-six percent.92  As a conse-
quence, according to some scholars, many agencies have reduced 
their regulatory activity.93
Administrative law scholars have scrambled to find mechanisms to 
avert such litigation.  One of the more prominent mechanisms is “ne-
gotiated rulemaking.”  Under a negotiated-rulemaking scheme, all af-
fected parties (including representatives from government, the private 
sector, and nongovernmental organizations) are consulted prior to a 
notice of proposed rulemaking.  The hope is that a negotiated-
rulemaking committee will reach agreement on a proposed rule.  If 
the committee reaches such an agreement, the agreement is then 
used as the basis for the proposed rule.94  Congress formally author-
ized the practice by passing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.95
Unfortunately, however, the empirical evidence on whether this time-
consuming procedure achieves positive results—whether in terms of 
keeping matters out of court or otherwise—is (at best) mixed.96
92 Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
1111, 1129. 
93 See id. at 1126-27 (“Administrative law scholars appear almost universally to ac-
cept that pre-enforcement judicial review of regulations at [the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA)], as well as at other agencies, has led to a decline in 
new regulations.”).  Coglianese himself disagrees with this perspective, however.  Id. at 
1127, 1128 & fig.1 (charting a doubling of NHTSA’s cumulative pages in the Code of 
Federal Regulations between 1976 and 1996). 
94 See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:  A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1982) (describing the process and aims of negotiated rulemaking). 
95 Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–
570a (2006)). 
96 See Coglianese, supra note 92, at 1131-36 (finding that negotiated rules were 
challenged at the EPA at about the same rate as non-negotiated rules).  Critics have 
also argued that negotiated rulemaking distorts the proper role of an agency “first, by 
reducing the agency to the level of a mere participant in the formulation of the rule, 
and second, by essentially denying that the agency has any responsibility beyond giving 
effect to the consensus achieved by the group.”  William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your 
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In the case of the PTO, the usual difficulties of addressing the ar-
guments of interest groups may be exacerbated by the agency’s rela-
tive inexperience with the rulemaking process.  Thus, the agency per-
sisted in pushing for the continuation and claims rules even after it 
modified the continuation portion of these rules in a manner that 
substantially negated their effect.  Specifically, by the time it issued the 
final continuation rules, the PTO had liberalized them to allow for a 
total of three additional applications as a matter of right.97  In con-
trast, the original proposed rules had allowed only one additional ap-
plication as a matter of right.98  The PTO’s own data suggested that, 
because of this liberalization, the rules would affect only a small per-
centage of applications.99  At the same time, by deciding that the rules 
would apply not only to future applications but also to already-filed ap-
plications—with respect to which applicants may (in reliance on the old 
practice) have made irrevocable strategic decisions—the agency made 
even this small effect a flashpoint.  Indeed, although a number of ICT 
firms and associations—including Apple, the Computer and Communi-
cations Industry Association (CCIA), the Business Software Alliance, 
Caterpillar, Cisco, eBay, IBM, and Intel—supported the original rules 
that allowed only one additional application as of right, only the CCIA 
supported the PTO in the judicial challenge to the rules.100
F.  Inequitable Conduct and the Federal Circuit 
As noted, the continuation-and-claims-rules package contained a 
requirement that unusually large applications contain an examination 
support document (ESD) detailing the prior art and the manner in 
Eyes:  Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL.
L. 55, 92 (1987). 
97 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(iv)(B) (2008). 
98 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applica-
tions, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,717-18 (Aug. 21, 2007) (codified in scattered sections of 
37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (indicating the change from the proposed rule). 
99 See id. at 46,718 (“Under the proposed changes, about eleven percent of the ap-
plications and requests for continued examination filed in fiscal year 2006 would have 
required a justification, where under the changes being adopted in this final rule less 
than three percent of the applications and requests for continued examination filed in 
fiscal year 2006 would have required a justification.”). 
100 For a separate empirical project on rulemaking by administrative agencies, my 
coauthor and I collected and analyzed all of the comments filed in response to the origi-
nal continuation and claims rules.  This listing is taken from our analysis of those com-
ments. See Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process:  
An Empirical Investigation (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
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which the claimed invention is an improvement over the prior art.101
To an administrative lawyer not steeped in the intricacies of patent 
law, such a requirement—even as applied to all patents and not simply 
to large ones—might appear unexceptional.  Many applications for 
benefits conferred by the government require the applicant to pro-
vide evidence in favor of its application.  Indeed, in the case of the 
Food and Drug Administration, pharmaceutical firms spend hundreds 
of millions of dollars compiling the human clinical data necessary to 
make their case.102
To be sure, in the case of the patent system, portions of the patent 
statute suggest that the burden of proving lack of patentability is on 
the examiner.  For example, the novelty provision of the patent stat-
ute provides that a person “shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the 
invention [is anticipated by the prior art].”103  In addition, courts, in-
cluding the Federal Circuit, have held that the PTO has the initial 
burden of proving lack of patentability.  However, even assuming that 
the PTO bears this burden with respect to all requirements of the pat-
ent statute (and not just novelty), the ESD requirement cannot fairly 
be read to shift the legal burden of proving patentability onto the ap-
plicant.  Rather, as the Federal Circuit opinion in Tafas v. Doll points 
out, the ESD merely requires information production in certain cases. 
In any event, in the case of the ESD, much of the opposition by in-
terest groups appears to stem not from philosophical resistance to the 
idea of providing information but from problematic Federal Circuit 
case law that arguably punishes applicants who attempt to provide use-
ful information and explanation about their patent applications.  Ap-
plicants note, with some justification, that under current Federal Cir-
cuit law any explanation they volunteer during the examination 
process may expose them to subsequent charges that they made a “ma-
terial misrepresentation or omission” before the PTO.  Even worse, 
under current Federal Circuit case law, the sanction is a virtual death 
penalty.  If the defendant in an infringement action succeeds in prov-
101 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
102 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation:  New Estimates of Drug Develop-
ment Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating that the development of a 
new drug, including marketing approval, costs hundreds of millions of dollars). 
103 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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ing such deception or “inequitable conduct” with respect to a single 
patent claim, the entire patent can be rendered unenforceable.104
Specifically, under the Federal Circuit’s somewhat inconsistent 
and shifting precedent for inequitable conduct, there exist at least five 
different tests of materiality,105 and information can be deemed mate-
rial under any of these tests.106  In contrast, the PTO’s own definition 
of what constitutes a material misrepresentation or omission is much 
more circumspect.  The PTO limits a finding of materiality to the 
situation where the noncumulative information either establishes a 
“prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim” or where the informa-
tion is inconsistent with an argument that the applicant has made re-
garding patentability.107  But the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held 
that the PTO definition is merely a starting point for this thinking 
about materiality—it is at best one of the many standards that appli-
cants must satisfy.108
Concerns about inequitable conduct also appear to have chilled 
the use of some promising mechanisms that the PTO has established 
to “tier” patent applications so that applicants who are willing to pro-
vide more information get more in exchange.  For example, under 
the agency’s current procedure for accelerated examination, the ap-
plicant is promised a decision within one year if the application com-
plies with certain disclosure requirements.109  On its face, one might 
imagine that accelerated examination could be attractive to applicants 
that deem their patents particularly important.  However, in part be-
cause of concerns of inequitable conduct, these disclosure require-
ments are considered sufficiently onerous that relatively few appli-
104 See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that if inequitable conduct is found, the patent is rendered 
unenforceable). 
105 See, e.g., Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (describing the five standards). 
106 Id. at 1316 (noting that the PTO’s newest standard did not replace the older 
standards).
107 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008). 
108 Digital Control Inc., 437 F.3d at 1316. 
109 See Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special 
and for Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,323 ( June 26, 2006) (describing the 
accelerated examination process); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Petition To 
Make Special Under Accelerated Examination Program, http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
forms/sb0028_fill.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (listing the conditions for receiving 
accelerated-examination treatment). 
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cants choose this option.  Between 2006, when the program was initi-
ated, and October 10, 2008, only 2460 applications were filed.110
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF INCREMENTAL REFORM
The obvious next question addresses the steps that should be 
taken going forward.  It is tempting for academics to propose funda-
mental changes to existing law that would create an ideal system.  Al-
though such proposals for an ideal system are by definition first-best, 
they are daunting for policymakers to implement.  At a minimum, the 
transition costs associated with fundamental change create a situation 
where proponents of such change bear a considerable burden.111
Relative to more fundamental reform, incremental changes fare  
well if they are more realistic and grant us much of what we want.  In 
what follows, I focus on some incremental options that would give the 
PTO an appropriate level of control over caseload management. 
Given the difficulties of securing congressional action—
particularly when Congress may be unwilling or unable to separate 
relatively simple administrative reform from highly contentious issues 
like damage awards in litigation—the judiciary is probably the more 
promising venue for conferring such control.  With respect to the 
critical question of authority over fees, however, only Congress can 
confer the requisite power upon the PTO.  The PTO should thus work 
to build the coalitions necessary to press Congress on relatively dis-
crete legislation on fees. 
110 PTO, PATENT DATA UPDATE, supra note 25, at 26 fig. 
111 Thus, for example, although Abramowicz and Duffy’s proposal for multiple 
bodies that would compete to perform the patent-search-and-evaluation function is 
intriguing, a move of that sort may best be attempted after more incremental steps 
have failed.  Even a move to a government-owned corporation, long advocated as a 
mechanism for avoiding some of the bureaucratic difficulties associated with govern-
ment employment and procurement regulations, may be a step better attempted after 
more incremental steps have failed.  In addition to imposing substantial transition 
costs, these options may also undermine the important role that a national patent of-
fice should play in helping the executive formulate innovation policy in the overall 
public interest. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Pol-
icy:  A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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A.  What the Judiciary Can Do 
1.  Substance Versus Procedure 
The highly controversial rules at issue in Tafas v. Doll make the 
case a less-than-ideal platform for a Federal Circuit decision offering a 
liberal interpretation of the PTO’s authority to manage its caseload.  
Nonetheless, the liberal interpretation offered by the majority opinion 
in the case is desirable.  The category of “substance” should not en-
compass any circumstance where the rule in question could be seen as 
altering applicant rights.  Such a definition unduly constrains agen-
cies, particularly an agency like the PTO that cannot afford to have 
any significant effort it makes to address its enormous workflow prob-
lems subject to a claim that its actions are ultra vires. 
The Federal Circuit opinion in Tafas correctly follows the ap-
proach of the D.C. Circuit, which has shifted its focus from asking 
whether a given rule change has a “substantial impact” on parties’ 
rights to inquiring “more broadly” into whether the rule change em-
bodies a “substantive value judgment.”112  The D.C. Circuit views its 
“gradual move away from looking solely into the substantiality of the 
impact [as] reflect[ing] a candid recognition that even unambigu-
ously procedural measures affect parties to some degree.”113  More-
over, under D.C. Circuit case law, rules that impose time limits on ap-
plications are not substantive, even if they could be seen as embodying 
a value judgment that applications exceeding the time limit are in 
some way less worthy than those filed within the time limit.114
To be sure, these D.C. Circuit cases parse the substance versus 
procedure dichotomy in the context of whether an agency needs to 
follow notice-and-comment rulemaking under section 553.  As both 
Judge Bryson’s concurrence and Judge Rader’s dissent in Tafas point 
out, interpretations rendered in the section 553 context should not 
necessarily dictate the scope of the PTO’s statutory rulemaking power.  
Even so, for purposes of interpreting the relatively terse statutory lan-
guage of the PTO’s organic statute, the D.C. Circuit cases provide 
valuable guideposts.  They also reflect the experience of a court that is 
constantly exposed to the challenges faced by agencies with significant 
workloads.  Regardless, any difference in context does not suggest that 
the PTO’s power should be any narrower than the D.C. Circuit case law 
112 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
113 Id.
114 Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr. v. NRC, 208 F.3d 256, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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on section 553 would suggest.  As Judge Bryson’s concurrence in Tafas
properly notes, “Congress has not used the broadest available lan-
guage in the statute that authorizes the PTO to engage in rulemaking, 
but neither has it used the narrowest.”115
2.  Inequitable Conduct 
The judiciary should also fix the anomaly of Federal Circuit case 
law that sets up courts as the sole arbiters of what constitutes fraud on 
the PTO and what the sanctions for such fraud should be.116  In the 
context of other agencies, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
agency itself should have the primary responsibility to police against 
fraud in its administrative processes.117  Given this Supreme Court case 
law, a strong argument can be made for the PTO taking the lead in re-
form of inequitable conduct.  Moreover, because rulemaking in this 
arena is properly regarded as procedural, and there is little if anything 
in the patent statute that speaks directly to the question, it should be 
subject to Chevron deference.118  Indeed, even absent new rulemaking, 
litigants could argue that the Federal Circuit must defer to the single, 
relatively narrow standard of materiality articulated by the PTO in Rule 
56.119
The progress that could be achieved through inequitable-conduct 
reform is difficult to overstate.  With such reform, interactions with 
applicants could be regulated in a much more rational manner.  In 
addition to accelerated examination, inequitable-conduct reform 
could also create opportunities (where appropriate) for more inten-
sive, on-the-record engagement between the examiner and the appli-
cant.  For example, in appropriate cases, on-the-record pre-first-office-
action interviews that obviate the need for multiple subsequent rounds 
of negotiation between examiner and applicant might be possible. 
115 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J., concurring). 
116 See supra Section II.F. 
117 See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) 
(noting this point in the context of the FDA).  Interestingly, in that case the Court 
noted that allowing “fraud-on-the-FDA claims” to be made in litigation would “cause 
applicants to fear that their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by 
the Administration, will later be judged insufficient . . . . Applicants would then have 
an incentive to submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants 
nor needs, resulting in additional burdens . . . .”  Id. at 351.  Similarly, a common com-
plaint on the part of the PTO is that certain applicants provide a plethora of prior art 
references with little explanation of their relevance. 
118 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
119 PTO, MPEP, supra note 45, app. R §1.56.
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More generally, inequitable-conduct reform would make the op-
tion of selecting faster120 or more rigorous121 examination significantly 
more attractive.  The appeal of a faster examination is obvious.  More 
rigorous examination may also be attractive to those applicants who 
want to enforce their patents because, under default principles of ad-
ministrative law, courts should give greater deference to rigorous ex-
aminations than they do to ordinary examination.122
B.  What Congress Must Do 
As noted above, in order for a request for intervention by Con-
gress to achieve traction quickly, it may be prudent to keep such a re-
quest narrow and divorced from the various litigation-stage controver-
sies that have stymied patent reform in prior Congresses.123  The key 
step Congress must take involves giving the PTO significantly greater 
authority over fee setting.  At a minimum, this fee-setting authority 
should include the authority to recoup expenses incurred on behalf 
of the applicant. 
As a supplement to the authority to recoup expenses, Congress 
could also consider granting the PTO some authority to use fees to 
regulate applicant behavior.  To protect against the possibility of the 
PTO using this authority recklessly (and against nondelegation con-
cerns), Congress could set out guidelines and criteria for the PTO.  
Congress could also provide that this grant of authority be reviewed 
periodically to determine whether it should be renewed. 
Perhaps the most prudent course would be for Congress to direct 
the PTO to do a study of mechanisms for employing user fees to regu-
late behavior.  As a prelude to action on a controversial question, such 
an approach is hardly unprecedented.  For example, in patent-reform 
legislation proposed in the 110th Congress, Congress included a pro-
vision directing the PTO to submit, within two years of the legisla-
120 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing accelerated examination). 
121 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 763, 770-75 (2002); Mark Lemley et al., What To Do About Bad Patents,
REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12 (proposing that applicants that selected into 
rigorous examination could get a stronger patent). 
122 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 5, at 273 (“In circumstances where rigorous 
administrative proceedings are in place, the result would be significantly greater defer-
ence than the Federal Circuit currently gives.”). 
123 Even the creation of a better postgrant administrative alternative to costly liti-
gation, important as it is as a matter of the proper functioning of the patent system, see
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 5, at 320-28, might be kept separate. 
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tion’s enactment, a report “on the operation of prior user rights in se-
lected countries in the industrialized world.”124
CONCLUSION
Incremental reform that gives the PTO greater control over its 
procedures and its budgetary outlook would move us a long way to-
ward a more efficient system of patent examination.  In our search for 
a first-best system, such incremental possibilities should not be over-
looked.  Indeed, in the area of substantive patent law, incremental 
movement toward a more administrative role for the PTO has been 
the major story of the last ten years of patent reform. 
124 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-319, at 6 (2007) (directing the PTO to submit a report 
that examines how prior-user rights affect, inter alia, innovation rates and the ability of 
start-up enterprises to attract venture capital). 
